The Costanza Administration

Michael Fullilove has written a piece in the Financial Times that pretty much sums up the modus operandi of the current administration. George Costanza, the ne'er do well friend of Jerry in the Seinfeld series, had a brainstorm one episode to “do the opposite” of every one of his impulses. He reasoned that since he has been so unsuccessful with women, his career and his relationships, that out of desperation, what would it hurt to be as counter-intuitive as possible?

Like Costanza, George W. Bush seems to be “doing the opposite”, and like Costanza, such a strategy works for a while, but then inevitably ends in disaster. Unlike Costanza, however, Bush's disaster is not just personal, but rather is lived upon our entire nation and most of the world. Fullilove writes:

...in its geopolitical incarnation, adherents to the Costanza doctrine cast aside many of the fundamental tenets they learnt at staff college or graduate school. Let me name a few.

First, military and diplomatic resources are finite and should be directed towards your greatest priority. An example of the opposite approach would be for a country that has been attacked by a non-state terrorist group to retaliate by removing a state regime that had nothing to do with the attack.

Second, take care not to weaken your intimidatory powers through poor military performance. Aim for short, sharp victories (such as that in the 1991 Gulf war) that get your adversaries worrying about the extent of US power. The opposite would be to launch a war of choice involving the drawn-out occupation of an Arab country – the kind of thing that gets your allies worrying about the limits of US power.

Third, you get by with help from friends. Although the powerful are sometimes tempted to go it alone, international support helps determine the perceived legitimacy of an action, which affects its risk and costs. Building this support requires discussion and compromise. The opposite would be to spurn real negotiations, slough off your allies, bin multilateral agreements you do not like and declare that you are not bound by the rules that govern everyone else.

Fourth, state-building is hard. Few of the international efforts at state-building since the cold war’s end have succeeded. Luckily there are numberless reports identifying lessons learnt. The alternative would be to do the opposite of what those reports recommend, for example by deploying insufficient troops and dismantling any extant national institutions such as the army.

Fifth, democracy is a blessing that requires patient nurturing. The opposite approach would be to seek to impose democracy by force of arms on a population traumatised by decades of vicious and totalitarian rule.

Sixth, politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. If two dangerous states are struggling for dominance of a strategic region, maintaining a balance between them may be the least worst option. The opposite would be to emasculate one of them, thereby greatly increasing the relative power of the other.

Finally, historians often cite the need for prudence in international relations, quoting the physician’s dictum: “First, do no harm.” The opposite would be: “Don’t think too much, just chance your arm and see what happens!”

I part with Fullilove's opinion, however, when he states that the Costanza Doctrine is based on “hope.” I would argue that nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, the “Opposite” Theory is based on laziness, ineptitude and lack of introspection; and his decisions are made out of desperation. Like Costanza, Bush has lived a life of failure and lacks the proper self-realization to correct his deficiencies.

“...and you want to be my latex salesman.”